OCTADE

@octade@soc.octade.net

(Owner soc.octade.net) (5&2)()()

For thoughtful response to thoughtful inquiry contact my email. Don't send me private direct messages on the Fediverse. If you have a general question ask it in a public timeline. I block users who send me annoying private messages about things that should be asked in a public timeline.

NAME : Raze
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[?]OCTADE » 🌐
@octade@soc.octade.net

@danmcd@hostux.social

chacha20 and some other ciphers are not susceptible to the meet-in-the-middle attack and choosing 2 or 3 of those ciphers to multicipher with different keys does increase the security of the ciphertext. I have a method in which I use chacha20 exclusively, but for each new encipherment in the cascade I generate a new, random salt, encrypt the salt with a unique stream key, generate a new hash-derived passphrase, and the salt is not prepended to the ciphertext. Breaking that is like putting scrambled eggs back in the shell and uncooking them.

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