OCTADE

@octade@soc.octade.net

The OCTADE profile has moved here:

https://star.octade.net/@8



(Owner soc.octade.net) (5&2)()()

Director of the International Department of Civil Disobedience.

For thoughtful response to thoughtful inquiry contact my email. Don't send me private direct messages on the Fediverse. If you have a general question ask it in a public timeline. I block users who send me annoying private messages about things that should be asked in a public timeline.

I sometimes post links to items I find curious, interesting, or of research and study value. This does not necessarily mean that I agree with the linked matter. Don't assume.

NAME : Raze
ACADEMIA.EDU
ABOUT
LINKS

SLOGAN : Speak not with words. Speak with work product.

PRONOMS : | | | | | |





LINKS

Cryptography project site
Publications
ORCID
[Netnews] Find me on in alt.flashback, alt.crossover, alt.rhubarb.
Git Repositories
Keyoxide1
Keyoxide2
BlueSky
HackerNews
Internet Archive

0 ★ 0 ↺
in reply to »

[?]OCTADE » 🌐
@octade@soc.octade.net

NOSTR has problems with its cryptography implementation that allow forging. One attack allows re-directing a Bitcoin transaction. Too many cooks spoil the stew with the large pool of client and server applications.

Not in The Prophecies: Practical Attacks on Nostr

https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1459


    ...
    1 ★ 0 ↺

    [?]OCTADE » 🌐
    @octade@soc.octade.net

    I often see the cult mantra:

    "It is more secure because it is open source and that means more eyes on the code."

    This is unscientific and magical thinking. It is not how security works in reality.

    The paper highlights the converse of this mantra:

    "Despite significant attention, the security of Nostr has not been thoroughly investigated to date."

    Just because a thing is open source it does not logically follow that there are actually eyes on the code. That is the wishful thinking part. There are millions of open source applications with not enough manpower to do thorough security analysis of all that code, especially since nobody is being paid to take the time for analysis.

    For example, I recommend DarkMX even though it is closed source. It has been available for many years and I have neither seen nor found an effective exploit. The developer has an impeccable reputation of producing simple, quality software for decades. People trust closed source Microsoft applications, and the DarkMX developer is much more trustworthy.

    To have faith in a trustless model you have to trust someone making a security claim anyway. At that point I evaluate the risk factors to decide whether or not to use the software. I have zero trust in the people behind NOSTR.

    History